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INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Government has recently undertaken a number of concrete initiatives to enhance 
national security policy coordination. At the time of this publication’s completion, some had been 
implemented – such as the ‘All Hazards National Assessment’ on Australia’s near-term security 
challenges, and the coordinated national security budget.1 Others, such as a national security 
capability plan, are still working towards maturity; while the progress towards the adoption of a 
risk-based approach to national security policy and planning remains unclear.2 Together, these 
new approaches to planning and prioritising will make important contributions towards 
establishing a comprehensive framework for national security policymaking in Australia. 
This paper proposes horizon scanning as an additional analytic method that is arguably 
essential to future-oriented thinking about Australia’s national security challenges. After first 
reviewing publicly-available information about the evolving Strategic Policy Framework (SPF, 
‘the framework’), this paper examines horizon scanning as a potential method that could fill an 
important gap in the framework. This will include a discussion of the meaning of horizon 
scanning, its value proposition, and how it is distinguished from related methods and processes 
such as intelligence. From there, the paper will identify different elements of a horizon scanning 
system and use a morphological analysis to develop system options to suit Australian conditions. 
While this paper has been significantly informed by the Australian and international literature, 
the findings have also been informed by practical experience in horizon scanning together with 
roundtables with horizon scanning experts from the Australian Government and the Australasian 
Joint Agencies Scanning Network.3  
This paper argues that it will be essential to incorporate horizon scanning into the SPF to 
engage fully in a risk-based approach to assessing potential new threats and opportunities in 
the strategic environment. The paper derives design options for a horizon scanning system, and 
recommends options for conducting this in the specific context of national security. Since the 
SPF is still evolving, the morphological analysis technique used in this paper will allow readers 
to consider new options as other elements of the framework become known, and as the 
preferences of senior decision-makers become clearer. 
THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The Prime Minister’s first National Security Statement of December 2008 announced a number 
of important changes to the structure and processes of national security policymaking, one of 
which was a ‘Strategic Policy Framework’ (SPF). This framework was intended to ‘guide and 
coordinate effort across the national security community by setting priorities, allocating 
resources and evaluating performance’.4 The aim was to set national security priorities in an 
                                                          
1
 Allan Gyngell, "National Security Lecture - The University of Canberra, 28 May 2010". 
2
  Kevin Rudd, "The First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament".  
3
  The author thanks the participants of these roundtables for their insights and helpful advice, especially Brett 
Peppler and Kate Delaney. For more on the Australasian Joint Agencies Scanning Network, see 
http://www.ajasn.com.au/login. 
4
  Rudd, "National Security Statement": 35. 
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‘informed, accountable, and whole-of-government manner’5, and would include periodic Prime 
Ministerial statements, centralised priority setting, a coordinated budget process and an 
evaluation mechanism. 6  The Government’s intention was clearly to introduce some of the 
planning processes used in other contexts, such as defence, into a broader national security 
context. In doing so, a number of complex challenges have been highlighted that make a future-
oriented posture for national security planning essential. 
The complete structure of the SPF has not been made public at the time of writing, but elements 
of it have been described or can be safely assumed. Those already described or announced 
elsewhere include an annual All-Hazards National Assessment, which examines changes in 
Australia’s security environment over the following three to five years.7 This assessment, which 
is coordinated by the Office of National Assessments (ONA), is developed to inform draft 
national security priorities and national intelligence priorities for consideration by Cabinet.8 This 
is logical and highly relevant work, especially because judgements about political change, 
economic fortunes, threat intentions and even some aspects of capability that look into the 
future lack the precision needed for decision-making.  
The national assessment would be complemented by periodic performance evaluations of all 
national security agencies.9 These evaluations would, in turn, be used to inform the Coordinated 
National Security Budget (CNSB). This budget submission has now been through four iterations 
and has been used to complement individual portfolio budget submissions. Perhaps most 
importantly, the CNSB has been used to provide an overview of proposed ‘spends and saves’; 
to group proposals according to a broad set of priorities; and to provide some advice on the 
relative importance of each.10 
Another major initiative is the National Security Capability Plan. This plan, which was 
announced in July 2011, aims to ‘ensure Australia’s national security community agrees on both 
the critical security risks facing our country and the capabilities required to respond to those 
risks in the future’.11 This plan would help non-Defence agencies identify current and emerging 
gaps in their equipment, training, and support (loosely grouped as ‘capability’), while 
simultaneously gaining a clearer picture of what resources would be available to respond to 
natural disasters or other major national threats.  
Taken together, these initiatives form a reasonable basis for approaching different aspects of 
the challenge involved with assigning resources to promote national security interests. However, 
some elements are missing. Perhaps these have not been publicly announced yet, and perhaps 
they are under development. Allowing for this uncertainty about government intentions, 
identifiable gaps remain in developing a way to prioritise effort to meet challenges to those 
                                                          
5
  Ibid: 36. 
6
  Duncan Lewis, "Australia’s National Security Framework": 3. See also Australian National Audit Office, 
Management of the Implementation of New Policy Initiatives: Australian Federal Police, ANAO Report No 29 
201-11 (2011); Appendix 5. 
7
  Gyngell, "National Security Lecture": 8. 
8
  Ibid: 8. 
9
  Rudd, "National Security Statement"; Lewis, "Australia’s National Security Framework": 3. 
10
  Australian Government, "Budget Paper No. 1, Statement 1: Budget Overview"; and Gyngell, "National 
Security Lecture": 8-9. On the role of the CNSB, see Dr Margot McCarthy, "National Security: Past, Present 
and Future": 11-12.  
11
  Robert McClelland, "Security in Government Conference 2011: Welcome and Opening Address": 1-3. 
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interests, and a way to assign resources to achieve objectives. These tasks are the province of 
risk assessment and strategy respectively.  
While this paper does not aim to describe the case for either activity,12 a precursor effort to both 
is needed to allow planners and policy officials to think across time. This facility and activity is 
essential because significant lead-time is needed to plan and develop capability, and avoid 
surprise, as Defence describes in its 2009 White Paper:  
…decisions taken in one decade have the potential to affect, for good or ill, Australia's 
sovereignty and freedom of action for decades to come. And, should we require defence 
capabilities in a crisis or conflict, they cannot be acquired overnight.
13
 
 
Indeed, Defence tends to think in 20–30 year timeframes while planning. This lead-time is 
needed because (defence) capital equipment is expensive, often takes a significant amount of 
time to plan and build, and remains in service for a long time. Time is also required because 
reorienting organisations towards new priorities and challenges means new training, new 
doctrine and often new human capital development plans. Again, surmounting these challenges 
takes time. As a result of the temporal realities, capability planners need to be very cognisant of 
the way strategic objectives, as well as threats and opportunities, may change in the future. This 
gaze will need to extend well beyond the usual timeframes for routine government decision-
making: it will be inherently subjective and fall within the providence of professional judgement. 
However, it is possible to think across time, especially in areas such as demographic change, 
technological development, environmental change and, to some extent, resource forecasts. One 
way to develop the long-term, strategic insight necessary is to adopt an activity such as horizon 
scanning. 
‘A THIN WISP OF TOMORROW’ 
The human desire for certainty, said Lord Hennessy, means governments place great importance 
in feeling for the ‘thin wisp of tomorrow’.14 Lord Hennessey goes on to identify past actions taken 
in the British defence community to help gain these insights, and concludes his speech by 
asserting a duty of governments to try to identify trends and what they might mean. This is 
reasonable, and horizon scanning was one method he recommended for this purpose.15 However, 
before we react to his exhortation, it is worth describing what horizon scanning is and is not, 
identifying its value proposition and success criteria, and describing the challenges of employing it 
to assist decision-makers. This brief analysis will show that many choices need to be considered 
before horizon scanning is implemented on a significant scale in any government. 
                                                          
12
  Some initial cases have been made for both planning activities: see Alan Dupont and William J. Reckmeyer, 
"Australia's national security priorities: addressing strategic risk in a globalised world", Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 66, no. 1 (2012); Michael Evans, "Towards an Australian National Security Strategy: A 
Conceptual Analysis", Security Challenges 3, no. 4 (2007); and Carl Ungerer, "The case for an Australian 
national security strategy", in Policy Analysis 84 (2011) for broad outlines of such proposals. Significantly, 
more work needs to be done before these ideas could be put into practice. 
13
  Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (2009): 15. 
14
  Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, "The Horizon Scanners’ Craft", (2011): 2. Lord Peter Hennessy is a 
distinguished British historian of government and national security. He credits Ferdinand Braudel for this 
description. 
15
  Ibid: 11. 
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The method described as horizon scanning is a deliberate or purposeful strategic planning 
activity where emerging changes and developments are analysed to identify events, trends and 
drivers (collectively, ‘factors’) that may shape an organisation’s future operating environment 
and so its policy, research and strategic agendas. 16  As such, horizon scanning is often a 
directed activity that seeks and analyses information concerning priority questions facing senior 
leaders about their external operating environment. 17  These parameters mean that horizon 
scanning is best used as part of an ongoing strategic planning process, or as a way to obtain 
insights into plausible factors that might influence decisions with long-term consequences. It is 
not, however, the only input to decision-making and, as later sections of this paper will discuss, 
its utility and product needs to be appraised with a cold eye. 
While horizon scanning could be conducted in many ways, a typical activity involves four stages: 
 Preparation. This stage focuses on two concurrent activities. The first involves 
scoping and team building. The former should develop the basic parameters for 
the scan, including the purpose of the scan, the time frame under consideration, 
the data presentation format, and the overall project plan. The second activity 
involves generating buy-in from senior management and contributors to the scan.18 
Without solid and broad support, proponents should consider the value of going 
forward with the scan, even if they have sufficient resources to begin the project. 
 Data collection. The data collection stage involves a project team ‘scanning’ for 
relevant information. Once relevant data is identified, it is catalogued and evaluated 
for impact by the scanning team. If a permanent scanning team is established, this 
search stage will be continuous. The key output of this stage is a database of reports 
identifying events, trends, drivers and possible wildcards. This stage may be 
conducted in a number of different ways. Data collection might be an active single 
task or conducted as part of routine work by relevant people in an organisation. It 
could also be periodic and aimed at a particular product or decision, or it could be an 
ongoing collection effort that serves many purposes. The data collection and indeed 
the whole scanning process might be directed or undirected, with the distinction 
being the narrowness or otherwise of the questions asked by senior management. 
 Synthesis. Many users of horizon scanning suggest exposing the collected data to 
a multidisciplinary expert audience. In this stage, experts debate and ultimately 
categorise the events, trends, drivers and wildcards identified by the scanning 
                                                          
16
  For samples of the wide variety of definitions of horizon scanning see W.L. Shultz, "The Cultural 
Contradictions of Managing Change: Using Horizon Scanning in an Evidence-based Policy Context", 
Foresight 8, no. 4 (2006); and Raphael Popper, "New Horizon Scanning Concepts, Practices and Systems", 
in 2
nd
 DSTL Scanning Conference (2011): slide 6. Chun Wei Choo identified other modes of horizon 
scanning, including those with less formality or structure than the method defined in this paper envisages 
(“The Art of Scanning the Environment”, Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science, Feb/Mar 
(1999): 22-23. 
17
  Beat Habegger, "Horizon Scanning in Government: Concept, Country Experiences, and Models for 
Switzerland", (2009): 8-12. Decision-makers might also look to use horizon scanning to help form questions. 
18
  Ben Ramalingam and Harry Jones, "Strategic Futures Planning: A Guide for Public Sector Organisations", 
Overseas Development Institute: 33, stress the importance of getting support from the entire organisation. 
This seems excessive, as only certain parts of most government organisations are likely to be interested in 
this kind of work and not view it as a distraction. Identifying exactly which parts are interested is an important 
part of the scoping task. 
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team. The typical scanning report includes a preliminary assessment of 
implications, and highlights interdependencies with other reports. This process can 
involve a workshop event that brings the experts together. The process of 
evaluating and categorising data can also be iterative, employing scenarios, a 
‘Delphi Survey’ or similar survey model to refine the expert judgements. 
 Presentation, decision and aftercare. Ultimately, horizon scanning must result in 
action designed to position the organisation for future challenges. Some may use 
horizon scanning to develop scenarios about the future, which can lead to ‘strategic 
conversations’ about likely threats and opportunities. In other circumstances, the 
direction of change can be inferred from the key trends and drivers and this can cue 
research. An aftercare program, which might include follow-up presentations about 
the results or further work based on questions raised, will help to derive the 
maximum value from the scanning effort. 
The ideal method for finding relevant factors is to seek and identify ‘weak signals’ portending 
new developments or change. These signals may come from many sources, but they are very 
unlikely to be from sources normally considered, such as newspapers, books or government 
publications. Instead, scanners will look for ‘hits’, new information of relevance in the more 
speculative and non-reviewed ‘grey’ literature of blogs, early reports of new scientific ideas or 
theoretical debates, trend-watching publications, and even fiction writing. From there, solid 
reasoning and argument is applied to identify possible matters of importance to the 
commissioning organisation.  
The way these insights are used within an organisation can vary. For some, scanning products 
will promote conversations about the future and help to focus senior decision-makers on 
emerging challenges.19 Horizon scanning might also be used as a way to identify threats and 
opportunities in a business, research or policy-related context. For others, horizon scanning can 
be about communication: internally to engage all levels of the organisation in thinking about the 
future, to generate new questions about the organisation’s future, and to communicate with 
external audiences in ways that build collaborative links or awareness. 20  In the last form, 
communication is about shaping expectations and preparing an agenda. These ‘hard’ uses are 
clearly designed to position an organisation for the future, but they are not the only potential 
uses. 
Other authors have pointed to the use of horizon scanning as a tool to build strategic thinking 
capability in an organisation; as a way to build networks; as an agent for change; and for mutual 
learning.21 These ‘softer’ uses appear to address some other priority needs for the Australian 
Public Service (APS), particularly as the recent ‘blueprint for reform’ described a perceived lack 
of strategy and innovation across the APS. According to the blueprint, employees do not feel 
equipped to develop strategic policy and delivery advice, collaboration is not a routine way of 
working, and the immediacy of day-to-day activities prevents employees from focusing on 
                                                          
19
  See Kees Van Der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation 2nd ed., (2005); Maurits Butter 
et.al, "Scanning for early recognition of emerging issues; dealing with the unexpected", (SESTI, 2010): 5. 
20
  Butter et al, "Scanning for early recognition of emerging issues"; A. Havas, et al. "The impact of foresight on 
innovation policy-making: recent experiences and future perspectives." Research Evaluation 19, no. 2 
(2010): 101-2; Kristian Gustafson, "Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence 
Community", Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 10 (2010): 602. 
21
  Habegger, "Horizon Scanning in Government": 9; Wendy Schultz, "The cultural contradictions of managing 
change": 5. 
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emerging issues and producing forward-looking policy analysis.22 This is considered to be a 
major deficiency of the APS. 
Despite some potential to help address this deficiency, horizon scanning has limitations. For 
one, it is an inexact art that may not generate significant insights or action: success depends 
upon the skill and creativity of those involved, and the willingness of senior leaders to use the 
product. The vast amount of information available can make review, analysis and retrieval a 
daunting task. This factor makes an agreed methodology and technological support essential for 
the project, and can make horizon scanning a resource-intensive activity unless it is well-
focused and supported.23 The rapid pace of change in some areas, especially technology, can 
also reduce the impact of scanning outputs by making the scan ‘perishable’. Lastly, horizon 
scanning also relies heavily on participants identifying the linkages between events and 
envisaging the implications of change for the organisation. As a consequence, it can be easy to 
claim too much for horizon scanning, and it is essential to establish some criteria for success.24 
Some of these criteria are straightforward. The scan must fill a need ideally, one identified and 
valued by senior leadership. The scan itself must be responsive to client needs, which entails 
being aware of how these needs will change over time, and making changes to products or 
focus as the emerging situation dictates. The involvement of appropriate stakeholders in the 
process in some way possibly as full participants, but perhaps in a review, debate or analysis 
function is another criteria which will likely help to build broad support for the final product. Most 
of these criteria are relatively tangible and can be measured, but they only fill part of the bill. 
Any scanning effort will also rely upon some less tangible or elusive success criteria that will 
probably be hard to create or estimate in advance. Among these will be the relative and 
intangible criteria best described as ‘senior leaders’ satisfaction’: a criterion that often relies on 
the subjective judgment of those being supported by the scan. Closely tied to this, the scan 
must produce insights that are considered plausible by users. While this might seem tangible at 
first, the credibility of this type of product can be difficult to measure except in hindsight. Also 
important, but simultaneously also awkward to measure, is ‘influence’. Ideally, one would like to 
be able to illustrate how a well-timed scanning product shifted the debate or unearthed a 
previously unseen opportunity. But attributing influence to a scan might prove difficult in 
instances in which ‘good ideas have many parents’, and claiming success could lead to 
resentment. Even more difficult to achieve will be a situation that futurist Richard Slaughter 
describes as a ‘legitimising process’. Indeed, it is the absence of this condition that undermined 
one of the most well-resourced efforts in horizon scanning and futures analysis, known as the 
Australian Commission for the Future (ACF).25 While the task of defining and then achieving 
these success factors might be inhibiting, one factor that would certainly undermine a horizon 
                                                          
22
  Advisory Group on Reform of Australian Government Administration, Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the 
Reform of Australian Government Administration, (2010): 41. 
23
  In terms of support, information technology is especially important to reducing search effort and 
matching new information to users. 
24
  For instance, O. Da Costa et al., think horizon scanning can perform roles across the policymaking system, 
including deep roles in implementation. See The Impact of Foresight on Policy-Making: Insights from the 
FORLEARN Mutual Learning Process, (2006): 372-6.  
25
  Richard A. Slaughter, "Lessons from the Australian Commission for the Future: 1986-98", Futures 31, no. 1 
(1999): 93-4. 
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scanning effort is the perception that it is merely replicating other efforts to provide advice to 
senior leaders about the environment of their future challenges.26  
This description of horizon scanning and its challenges, and the warning about duplication, 
should lead to an obvious question from national security practitioners: how does this activity 
and product differ from intelligence? Indeed, the close relationship between the two has led 
some to suggest that horizon scanning should be the responsibility of intelligence agencies.27 
But while closely related – especially in as far as intelligence agencies might conduct horizon 
scanning – these two processes or products have conceptual and practical differences.  
While there is no clear consensus about the definition of intelligence, a brief examination of two 
attempts to define it does help to illustrate the distinctions between intelligence and horizon 
scanning:  
[Intelligence is] information that enables you to protect your interests or maintain a valuable 
advantage in advancing your interests over those posing threats to them.
28
 
Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around 
us – the prelude to decision and action by US policymakers.
29
 
These definitions characterise intelligence as forward-looking, decision-oriented information. 
While horizon scanning also shares these characteristics, intelligence tends to support 
decisions about immediate concerns and threats to interests, lives or property, especially when 
formulated as ‘current intelligence’.30 Intelligence also tends to place classified information at the 
centre of assessments, mainly because its aim is to expose secrets such as others’ intentions or 
immediate capability. This is not the role of horizon scanning. While it can help inform current 
decisions, horizon scanning tends to look for emerging trends that, because of their ambiguity 
and speculative nature, do not meet the standard of evidence or probability expected of 
intelligence.31 The type of information used in horizon scanning is generally (perhaps mainly) 
obtainable in the ‘open source’ (i.e. public) literature where the broad directions of societies are 
canvassed. Given these similarities and differences, national security policymakers, especially 
those involved in long-term assessments, strategy, risk assessment or capability development, 
will want access to both kinds of information in their advice and decision-making processes; 
keeping the two separate has the distinct advantage of helping to ensure that neither is 
confused with the other.  
                                                          
26
  Jonathon Calof and Jack Smith, "Critical Success Factors For Government Led Foresight", in Third 
International Seminar on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (2008): 7. The authors list other critical 
success factors for horizon scanning which, on the face of them, place a significant emphasis on a 
favourable political climate and using early success to promote the process. 
27
  Gustafson, "Strategic Horizons": 591. 
28
   Robert Cornall and Rufus Black, 2011 Independent Review of the Intelligence Community Report (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011): 6. 
29
  Central Intelligence Agency, "A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence", (Washington, DC: CIA Office of Public 
Affairs, 1999): vii. 
30
  Described in the US context as a ‘tyranny’ by Jeffrey R. Cooper, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to 
Improved Intelligence Analysis, (Washington DC: Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 2005): 32. 
31
  The use of horizon scanning in current decisions is well described in terms of ‘thinking in three time 
horizons’. See Mehrdad Baghai, Stephen Coley and David White, Alchemy of Growth (London: Orion 
Business, 1999). 
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The value of horizon scanning can be expressed in two ways. The first is a general proposition, 
which claims that the long-view nature of horizon scanning will help leaders to become less 
reactive. A well-conducted scan will achieve this because there is latitude for the scanners to 
explore so-called weak signals and develop narratives about long-term trends. Since this search 
does not merely concern threats, horizon scanning can help to illuminate possible opportunities, 
be they in the form of new technology or even changing attitudes. Perhaps the most valuable 
aspect of this proposition for time-poor senior leaders is the way in which high-quality scanning 
product provides them with the space, structure and distilled information to be able to discuss the 
organisation’s future and its priority challenges. As has been noted by others, such as Ross 
Babbage of the Kokoda Foundation and the authors of the APS Reform Blueprint, increasingly 
crowded decision agendas have impinged on the amount of time available to consider longer-term 
matters.32 
A second, more specific element of the value proposition for horizon scanning for Australia’s 
emerging SPF derives from its product. When done well, horizon scanning should provide a 
view of the broad trends, weak signals and possible events beyond the 3-5 year view of the 
current All Hazards National Assessment. This could allow those using horizon scanning 
product to make decisions about an organisation’s future even if only in terms of highlighting 
detailed research needs well before the trends emerge as time-critical challenges.  
Based on the existing long-range gap in the assessment used for the SPF and these value 
propositions, it is clearly worth considering horizon scanning as another analytical tool for this 
framework. The scanning method is suggested as a potentially useful tool because it can 
provide decision-makers with targeted advice about, and deliberative space to consider, trends 
and drivers that will likely shape the future. Given the nature of the SPF, it is safe to assume 
that such advice would need to be developed and presented as part of a process that is led, 
resourced, conducted and analysed within government, probably with some involvement from 
experts outside the official community. But there are many, many ways that such a process and 
its products could be designed and packaged as discrete options for a suitable system. Efforts 
to visualise and explain such options would be well served by an analytical tool that presents 
elements of a problem comprehensively, describes many options clearly, and is flexible enough 
to cope with changed parameters and still remain useful. One such tool is morphological 
analysis. The next part of this paper will apply this method to the challenge of articulating some 
broad options for a horizon scanning system that will suit the purpose of the SPF.  
OPTIONS FOR A HORIZON SCANNING SYSTEM 
Faced with the challenge of designing a rocket system, Swiss astronomer Fritz Zwicky broke the 
known system down into parameters (component parts) and the differing values for these 
parameters (conditions) and presented these as a comprehensive matrix. The matrix was then 
used to investigate the relationships created when the values of each parameter are combined 
into a prospective system. The result was a range of internally consistent options that could be 
                                                          
32
  Ross Babbage, Strategic decision-making: optimising Australia's national security planning and coordination 
for 2015 (Canberra, Kokoda Foundation, 2008): 6-9; Advisory Group on Reform of Australian Government 
Administration, Ahead of the Game: 21. 
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employed to satisfy the problem at hand. This method became known as (General) 
Morphological Analysis.33  
In this paper, morphological analysis will be employed to identify options for the potential ways 
to design a horizon scanning effort for the SPF. The parameters for this particular horizon 
scanning system have been selected after a literature review and discussions with expert 
roundtables, and grouped following the architectural axiom ‘form follows function’. The aim is to 
identify the key parameters of form and function that decision-makers will need to consider as 
they review any proposal for a horizon scanning system. Within each parameter a number of 
different values have been identified in an effort to provide a comprehensive coverage of the 
way each parameter could be performed within this system. The result of this exercise is shown 
in Table 1. Since there are just over 1.6 million possible combinations in this table, the next 
process involves identifying and discarding inconsistent value combinations to produce a 
smaller (but admittedly still very large) number of potential options for a candidate system. 
The matrix begins by identifying the function variables, which essentially describe the purpose 
and expected outcomes of the scanning effort, and placing these across the top row. The key 
variable, and indeed the key decision, is the first: whether the scan is based on a broader 
government effort or whether it will be a stand-alone effort focused on national security. There 
are significant advantages for both, and neither, of itself, assumes that the eventual scanning 
product will be open source or classified. 34  Indeed, as will be described later, the main 
advantage of nesting the scan in a broader whole-of-government effort is the breadth of 
expertise and literature that could be covered. This might also constitute an economical 
measure, as the overhead costs are shared among many. Still, the scan will need to create 
product relevant to the concerns of senior national security officials: a broader effort might 
compromise that focus if the responsible team is not careful. The broader effort might also make 
it more difficult to use classified inputs to the scan, which might be seen as highly detrimental to 
the intended outcome. 
As the earlier discussion explained, support for a horizon scanning effort, including resource 
commitments and direction, needs to derive from an appropriate level of responsibility. In this 
instance, there are numerous plausible options for a sponsor or commissioning authority 
ranging from ministerial level, through to more junior officials, to a mixed board of official and 
invited external members. This authority will become the focus of the scan output: their 
questions and priorities will guide the scan effort and be the principal measure for determining 
the scan’s success or otherwise. 
The type of product and release policy refines the purpose further by providing guidance on the 
expected presentation of scan reports. It is important for this detail to be decided early because 
scanning organisations with significant contributions from non-national security agencies might 
find it difficult to manage a classified scan. 
 
                                                          
33
  Tom Ritchley, "General Morphological Analysis: A general method for non-quantified modelling", Swedish 
Morphological Society: 2-7. 
34
  Both the US Director of National Intelligence (http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf) 
and the UK Ministry of Defence (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/) publish horizon scanning 
documents in the public domain. 
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Table 1: Crafting options: elements of a horizon scanning (HS) system 
 HS System Function Parameters HS System Form Parameters  
Purpose General 
method 
Reporting 
frequency 
Sponsor Release policy Type of 
product 
Hosting 
Responsibility 
Scanning 
team 
participants 
Outreach Team 
structure 
Aftercare 
a b c d e f g h i j k 
P
ar
am
e
te
r 
V
al
u
e
s 
1 Scan for all 
national 
policy 
fields 
Active Bi-yearly 
major 
report 
Ministerial All reports 
released 
publicly 
Synthesised 
scan reports 
Central 
agency 
Intelligence 
only 
Public 
conference 
‘Centre of 
Excellence’ 
Dedicated 
team 
2 Single-
purpose 
scan for all 
National 
Security 
fields  
Passive Yearly 
report 
with 
additional 
short 
reports 
Secretary-
level 
Selected 
(declassified?) 
reports made 
public 
Multi-
subject 
reports 
General Policy 
department 
 
All 
government 
only 
Close 
network 
conference 
and 
seminars 
Dedicated 
team 
Follow-up 
by 
individuals 
3 HS specific 
to National 
security 
strategy 
framework 
 Frequent 
short 
reports 
Deputy 
Secretary-
level 
Reports 
released only to 
a closed 
network 
Single-
subject 
reports 
National 
Security policy 
department 
Government 
and non-
government 
participants  
Classified 
conference 
and 
seminars 
Small core Nil 
4   Timed to 
meet 
needs 
Below 
Deputy 
Secretary 
All product 
classified 
 Intelligence 
agency 
 No 
conference 
or seminars 
Individual 
coordinator 
 
5   One-off 
effort 
Board 
including 
non-
government 
members 
  Public-private 
joint venture 
(government 
with 
University, 
Think tank, 
incorporated 
company 
  Virtual team 
(network) 
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The ‘function’ of the horizon scanning system influences the choice of variables that define the 
‘form’ of the organisation tasked with the scan. The form variables include the hosting 
responsibility, which will have an important impact upon how the scan might be undertaken and 
candidates who could participate. Following this, the next two variables concern the team 
structure and the question of who will participate in the team. The last two variables considered 
are outreach and ‘aftercare’, which includes follow-up activities such as presentations and written 
explanations of the findings, and preparations for the next product. These last variables will have 
implications for participation, resourcing and communication. 
The parameter values chosen for Table 1 have been selected with the aim of producing a scan 
suitable for informing national security policy officials. This means some possible values have 
been omitted, such as a scan conducted wholly outside government. A few others can also be 
omitted from further consideration because it is possible to make some assumptions about the 
type of system that government would not want for this scan. The first to be discarded is a passive 
option for conducting the scan, which reflects an assumption about government preferences for 
organisation and accountable outcomes.35 A ‘Centre of Excellence’ model is also discarded due to 
the fiscal constraints that are likely to unnecessarily limit the appetite for new Australian 
Government initiatives for a number of years to come.36 ‘Classified only’ product is also discarded, 
mainly because this is likely to be impractical if a broad focus for the scan is chosen, or significant 
non-government expertise is involved in the activity. Along the same lines, a scanning group 
involving ‘intelligence only’ participants is also discarded because broader participation will most 
likely lead to better results.37 These few emissions have reduced the number of possible options 
by two-thirds from the original possible grouping: still an impractical number to describe in detail, 
but a good indication of the broad nature of the horizon scanning task and the ways in which it 
could be approached.  
With this breadth in mind, two possible options will be sketched below. Each option aims to be 
internally consistent and to provide a genuinely different approach. While only one value has 
been selected for each parameter in most cases, a second value is sometimes used to show 
the subtle distinctions that could be made when assembling viable options. Some additional 
decisions that need to be made about the scanning system will also be presented after each 
option is explained. 
The first is Option 1: Plug-in and Collaborate. The purpose behind this option is to produce an 
active whole-of government scanning effort that satisfies a number of policy areas, with national 
security being only one. As this is a government-wide effort, and potentially not only limited to 
the Commonwealth, the assumed size of the resources available and the numbers of team 
participants that could be mustered in support are considerable. While the resources are 
assumed to fall short of the ‘centre of excellence model’, an effort of this size and expertise 
means that the scan could attempt to produce a single, multi-field report and produce additional 
                                                          
35
  The active/passive distinction drawn in this paper may indeed be too stark, especially where technology 
can enable better searching and data matching (discussion with Brett Peppler). 
36
   Habegger, "Horizon Scanning in Government": 17-20 describes an initiative such as this by the Singaporean 
Government. 
37
  For example, see Ibid: 23; and examples of ‘participatory scanning activities’, often utilising Web 2.0 
technologies such as iKnow (http://community.iknowfutures.eu/). Another project, the multinational scanning 
project SESTI (www.sesti.info) is based on a consortium of international universities.  
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short reports on topics of most interest to the steering board, or, alternatively, more frequent 
reports that could satisfy a broader range of priority subjects.  
The large number of stakeholders means this type of scan should be managed from the top 
levels of government. While ministerial-level involvement was seen as an impediment in one 
review because political alignment compromised the credibility of the scan,38 there is no credible 
benefit in circumventing the need to secure ministerial support for an effort involving a 
significant amount of resources. Still, ministerial steering is another matter. In this option a 
steering board at the Departmental Secretary / Deputy Secretary level is envisaged because 
these officials control significant resources and understand ministerial priorities. There would 
also be the opportunity to involve non-government officials on this board, which might help to 
include broader perspectives in the tasking directives.  
With non-government involvement at the steering and probably participation levels, the scan 
would also best be conducted in an ‘open’ style so that security classifications are not a factor, 
at least not until the final stages of analysis. Ways to achieve this style might include inviting 
non-government experts to join the sponsoring board; forming a ‘joint venture’ hosting 
arrangement, perhaps in a university; and developing the ability to share some, if not most, of 
the product. This option does not preclude additional classified analysis conducted solely within 
government for the specific purpose of informing the SPF or the like, although such product is 
likely to come late in the process and bring an additional cost overhead. 
The broad nature of such a scan lends itself to the host being a central agency to ensure that 
the whole-of-government perspective is met. However, the joint venture model is another way to 
achieve this, as any venture could be specifically established to fulfil that mandate. In the 
Australian context, the Australian National Institute for Public Policy (ANIPP) at the Australian 
National University might be a sound joint venture partner, or the informal Australasian Joint 
Agencies Scanning Network (AJASN) might be augmented to enhance its ability to coordinate 
this large activity. 
Significant outreach and aftercare is envisaged for this option. This could include conferences or 
working groups to develop product, and publicly released analysis to inform and advise. In time, 
the scan might be seen as a public good that would inform other sectors of the community. The 
scan products could also provide a valuable contribution to, and so entree to, international 
scanning efforts. 
The participants suggested for this option include government and non-government experts 
based on a core staff and a network of experts. This model is considered to be the most 
appropriate way to harness national and international talent in this effort, and to ensure that the 
best possible sources of information and expertise are available to the scanning team. The team 
itself would be relatively small, perhaps four to ten people, depending on the resources 
available across government and the frequency of products; it would be capable of coordinating 
input from the scanning network’s member agencies and be ultimately responsible for meeting 
the steering board’s priorities.  
The key advantages of Option 1 include its ability to co-opt and consult leading thinkers 
regarding emerging trends, which is likely to make available the widest possible array of data 
                                                          
38
  Slaughter, "Lessons from the Australian Commission for the Future": 3. 
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and analysis. This option also spreads costs over many participants, or allows for easy 
collaboration with existing security and non-security horizon scanning activities, such as the 
AJASN. If such an approach is acceptable, the resource implications of this option could be 
relatively small, with central agencies encouraging national security agencies to participate in 
the network. An additional layer of analysis for national security purposes might be needed to 
ensure fitness for purpose, but this is likely to involve a relatively small number of people to act 
as a core to manage a separate product suitable to inform selected SPF activities, such as the 
National Security Capability Plan or similar. 
The main disadvantages include the breadth of focus, which could mean that national security 
agencies are involved with tangential work. The time schedule for delivering scan reports would 
probably need to be more generic, and therefore might not suit specific customers such as 
national security officials. Its openness might also inhibit some discussions concerning particular 
countries or technologies, especially if classified information would help in understanding the 
related trends. Importantly, the assumed efficiencies of this approach might also be lost if an 
additional, dedicated effort is still required to meet the needs of the SPF. Despite these possible 
drawbacks, the Plug-in and Collaborate options could provide an effective interim step, or actually 
be the best option where resource constraints dominate considerations. 
Option 1: Plug-in and Collaborate 
 HS System Function Parameters HS System Form Parameters  
Purpose General 
method 
Reporting 
frequency 
Sponsor Release 
policy 
Type of 
product 
Hosting 
Responsibility 
Scanning 
team 
Team 
structure 
Outreach Aftercare 
a b c d e f g h i j k 
P
ar
am
e
te
r 
V
al
u
e
s 
Scan for 
all 
national 
policy 
fields 
Active Yearly 
report with 
additional 
short 
reports 
Secretary-
level 
Reports 
released 
only to a 
closed 
network 
Synthesised 
scan 
reports 
Central 
agency 
Government 
and non-
government 
participants 
Small core Close 
network 
conference 
and 
seminars 
Small core 
  Frequent 
short 
reports 
Deputy 
Secretary-
level 
 Multi-
subject 
reports 
Joint venture: 
Govt and 
other 
   Individual 
coordinat
or 
   Board 
including 
non-govt 
members 
       
Option 2 is a Bespoke System for the SPF. While collaboration with other horizon scans will 
occur at different stages of bespoke scan, the purpose of this system is to meet the specific 
needs of the SPF and is structured accordingly. This means that the sponsors, host and 
scanning team members would be drawn primarily, and perhaps solely, from government. 
The products of this scan would be structured, focused and timed to meet the key input needs 
of the SPF, and these would not be released publicly (at least, not without extensive revision to 
remove classified information or findings). Given the aim and more closed nature of the activity, 
the sponsoring group could be formed from the second or third-tier of senior officials and hosted 
from either a policy agency or a central agency: a likely candidate is the (appropriately 
resourced) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The scan product would be an 
important input to specific SPF activities, such as national security statements, the National 
Security Capability Plan or other similar activities. This would allow the scan to produce 
classified products on very sensitive matters. The product of this scan would complement 
intelligence analysis such as the shorter-term annual ‘All Hazards National Assessment’. 
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Given the specific nature of this scan, a scanning team of 4-10 core government participants 
would be needed; once again, the comprehensiveness and frequency of the products would 
have a strong influence on the resources needed. This team could, of course, be augmented 
with short-term secondees. In contrast to Option 1, this team would be resourced from within the 
subset of Commonwealth agencies with responsibilities for national security. Regardless of the 
actual size of the core team, a very wide range of relevant agencies should be involved in some 
way. This could involve up to seventeen Commonwealth government agencies; more if State 
and Territory governments also participate. External experts should be consulted widely, 
although sharing product or process activities could be problematic if security classifications are 
imposed on the product or process activities.  
The need for outreach and aftercare is probably more limited in Option 2, and would be focused 
on internal, i.e., national security, audiences. It would be possible to use product in some, more 
closed international situations, perhaps in cooperation with close security partners. The main 
advantages of Option 2 are its focus and responsiveness. While scan participants would be free 
to look where they need to and consult external sources, the intended product would be clearly 
focused on national security and delivered within resources allocated to the task. The ability to 
conduct work at a classified level is greater with this option than with Option 1. Indeed, some 
might ask why this would not be conducted within an intelligence agency: the best response to 
this is that, despite the more closed nature of this work, hosting the scan in an intelligence 
agency would be a difficult option to manage due to the earlier described desire to differentiate 
scanning from intelligence as well as practical matters such as the closed nature of intelligence 
IT systems and significant vetting processes that are required before people can work in this 
environment.39 
The responsiveness of this option is another important advantage over Option 1. While the 
bespoke option involves a large number of national security agencies, the number of agencies 
involved in a whole-of-government effort might easily exceed twice or three times that number. 
Identifying the optimal time to deliver product would be a challenge. Another advantage might 
come from the ability to maintain a relatively simpler tasking process. The principal 
disadvantages of this option reflect the advantages of Option 1: coverage and cost. With the 
scanning team probably being drawn from a narrower base of expertise, it is possible that some 
trends external to mainstream national security analysis might not receive due attention or not be 
analysed by experts. Of course, there are ways to mitigate this disadvantage, and experienced 
scanners are likely to consult and cast their information nets very widely. On the surface, this 
option is likely to be more expensive than Option 1, with the full cost being shared among the 
national security agencies. While some current scanning activity would be leveraged, this is 
essentially a new task that will require new staff effort. 
  
                                                          
39
  The desire to promote a large degree of engagement with non-government sources expertise in a scan is 
not a reason for recommending against using an intelligence agency as a host, because Australian 
intelligence agencies are becoming adept at seeking advice from external sources. 
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Option 2: Bespoke System for the SPF 
 HS System Function Parameters HS System Form Parameters  
Purpose General 
method 
Reporting 
frequency 
Sponsor Release 
policy 
Type of 
product 
Hosting 
Responsibil
ity 
Scanning 
team 
Team 
structure 
Outreach Aftercare 
a b c d e f g h i j k 
P
ar
am
e
te
r 
V
al
u
e
s 
Scan 
specific 
to 
national 
security 
SPF 
Active Timed to 
meet needs 
(i.e. of SPF) 
Deputy 
Secretary
-level 
Reports 
released 
only to 
closed 
network 
Synthesised 
scan 
reports 
National 
Security 
Policy dept. 
Government 
only 
participants 
Dedicated 
team 
No 
conference 
or seminars 
Follow-up 
by 
individuals 
   Below 
Deputy 
Secretary 
  Central 
agency 
 Small core   
 
On balance, the optimal solution for the national security community is Option 2 because it is 
focused; it is most likely to be responsive to the needs of the SPF; and, unlike Option 1, 
classified product can be intrinsic to the main process. This makes it possible for the bespoke 
option to use existing scanning efforts that are currently being undertaken by national security 
agencies. Also, the ‘openness’ advantage of Option 1 could be diluted by skillful collaboration 
with existing non-security scans, and by counseling the scanning team to search widely. 
Furthermore, there is nothing to preclude the bespoke option planning team from joining the 
AJASN, which would also serve to ensure breadth in research and engagement with a broad 
audience. 
Further variations could be made to this model. For instance, the purpose of Option 2 could be 
expanded to support all planning across the national security policy area, such as supporting 
future defence, border security or counter-terrorism white papers. Such a scan would certainly 
be extensive, but in all probability less focused and more expensive than the existing Option 2 
proposal because a larger scanning team might be required. However, this broader purpose 
could absorb some existing scanning efforts and so help to reduce duplication. Another variation 
could involve hosting the Option 2 model through a joint venture arrangement with an institution 
such as the Australian National University’s National Security College. This option may offer the 
scan the best of both worlds because the National Security College is already established as a 
joint venture and includes staff seconded from the public service. Information security would, 
however, be more complex than Option 2 currently assumes. 
Further tinkering with aspects of product, team and process in both options are feasible, 
although some aspects would have resource implications. For example, additional products, or 
a thorough aftercare plan which involves engagement with a variety of audiences, would almost 
certainly require more resources than Option 2 currently envisages. Changes to engage more 
groups or sources of expertise in the scan process, such as expanding the board to include 
non-government experts, are also possible, and might be attractive to senior decision-makers if 
openness and communication are vital.  
In addition to these broad considerations of function and form, decision-makers will need to 
consider a range of other matters. Settling the time dimension, for instance, will be an important 
decision. Many scans or futures activities tend to operate in the 20–30 year time band, and this 
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seems like the kind of range for capability or similar planning activities.40 But such a timeframe 
might not suit other purposes, such as risk management or strategy. Information connectivity 
will be another key decision, and will be determined largely by the level of security needed for 
the scan data and product. As the earlier mention of success factors suggests, evaluation is 
best built into the scanning system, and this process and criteria should receive significant 
attention from the outset. Even earlier still, officials with potential responsibilities for a horizon 
scanning initiative should conduct a needs analysis to identify exactly what is currently being 
done in this space, and importantly the type of help that senior officials want with regards to 
making decisions about the balance of attention and resources concerning Australia’s future 
national security challenges. They would not want to grasp and present a ‘wisp’ of the future 
that does not make a material contribution to helping senior officials to meet the challenges 
faced by their respective organisations, and the nation at large. 
CONCLUSION 
The Australian Government’s evolving national security Strategy Planning Framework enters 
new space. It has, for the first time, taken a broad view of Australia’s national security 
challenges, and resolved to enhance coordination and develop detailed plans about the future in 
areas such as capability development. Some elements of the Framework and its supporting 
tools have already been identified and all seem logical and achievable, with significant effort and 
goodwill. One missing element is a tool like horizon scanning, which this paper contends is very 
important as a planning activity because it can cover many issue areas and take an extended 
view of Australia’s security challenges over time.  
The value of undertaking horizon scanning in the national security space is clear, particularly in 
the general way it helps to provide senior officials with space to think expansively about the 
future and be less reactive to trends. More specifically, horizon scanning will also provide value 
in terms of filling a gap between the existing shorter-term All Hazards National Assessment and 
the big drivers that will unfold beyond 3–5 years hence. As the expert workshops consulted as 
part of this project show, different parts of government are already taking advantage of 
methodologies such as this to support decision-making today. What is needed now are possible 
ways to create a horizon scanning system that will suit both the SPF and the needs of the 
Australian Government. 
This paper has suggested two broad options that essentially differ in the way they support 
different groupings of national decision-makers. Option 1, which was based on promoting a 
whole-of-government and perhaps even broader scanning network, was described as having 
significant advantages in terms of the range of expertise it could muster and the openness of its 
processes in support of essentially all policy decision-makers. In contrast, the narrower focus of 
the bespoke Option 2 would provide national security decision-makers with a laser-like focus on 
their needs and those of the SPF. Both options would be feasible and both could produce a 
result if implemented after a careful needs assessment and with real support from senior 
leaders.  
Still, the focus and responsiveness of Option 2, if tempered with a deliberately collaborative 
attitude towards non-security scanning efforts, makes it a superior yet probably marginally more 
                                                          
40
  Ramalingam and Jones, "Strategic Futures Planning": 32-3.  
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expensive option: this should be developed further if Australia’s national security community 
accepts the value proposition of horizon scanning. Whether Option 2 either provides the best fit 
at the time of decision or is the most attractive choice will depend upon the preferences of those 
decision-makers and the weight they place on the various technical, resource and ‘small-p’ 
political factors that are difficult to assess from a distance. For instance, some excluded 
variations might become more attractive, such as an extensive and expensive ‘centre of 
excellence’ model, if the government’s fiscal priorities change. These uncertainties help to make 
morphological analysis a useful tool because it provides decision-makers with a further menu to 
build a system that suits their needs, without necessarily having to return to the drawing board. 
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